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TREBLE DAMAGE SUIT UNDER THE CLAYTON ACT-
SOME OVERLOOKED ASPECTS OF DEFENSE
Osborn v. Sinclair Refining Co.,
324 P.2d 566 (4 th Cir. 1963)
Plaintiff Osborn was the holder of a dealer's sales agreement and
service station lease from Sinclair' in Reisterstown, Maryland. Osborn
also held a Firestone tires, batteries, and accessories (TBA) franchise in
Westminster, Maryland, and operated a Firestone TBA business in his
Sinclair station. Sinclair had arrangements with Goodyear, a manu-
facturer of TBA, whereby Sinclair received a commission on the sale
of Goodyear TBA to Sinclair dealers. Although Sinclair did not require
its dealers to handle Goodyear TBA exclusively, it encouraged them to do
so and actively promoted the line. In 1948, Sinclair cancelled Osborn's
first lease, partially because of a decline in gasoline sales, and partially for
failure to purchase enough Goodyear TBA. After negotiations, plaintiff
placed an order for over 1,000 dollars worth of Goodyear TBA, and his
lease was renewed. This second lease provided for a rental of one and
one-half cents per gallon of gasoline delivered to Osborn, with a minimum
of 400 dollars per month,2 and was terminable by either party at the end
of any yearly term on thirty days notice. In a 1949 meeting it was made
clear to dealers in the Sherwood division that Sinclair was dissatisfied
with the sales of Goodyear TBA, and that unless there was an improve-
ment, some leases would be terminated. After the new lease was nego-
tiated, plaintiff did purchase increased quantities of Goodyear TBA, yet
he also purchased ten times as much Firestone TBA. In 1956, Sinclair
again terminated Osborn's lease because of insufficient sales of gasoline
and Goodyear TBA. Plaintiff subsequently commenced an action under
the Clayton Act3 to recover treble damages, alleging injury resulting from
an attempt by Sinclair to monopolize the sale of TBA to its franchise
1 Sherwood Bros., Inc. was formerly an independent distributor of petroleum
products in Maryland. It became a wholly owned subsidiary of Sinclair in 1935,
selling Sinclair products in Maryland and in some areas of adjacent states. The
subsidiary was merged with Sinclair in 1955, and its distributing area is referred to
as the Sherwood division. Defendant is occasionally referred to as Sinclair-Sherwood
or Sherwood.
2 Sinclair often waived this minimum and accepted lower amounts.
a Clayton Act § 4, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958): "Any person who
shall be injured . . . by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may ...
recover threefold the damages by him . . . sustained."
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holders4 or from a Sinclair-Goodyear combination or conspiracy in re-
straint of trade.5
The United States District Court for the District of Maryland held
first, that there was no violation of the antitrust laws within the terms
of the agreement between Goodyear and Sinclair, or between Sinclair and
its dealers, and second, that the agreements were not used illegally. The
court held that Sinclair was within its legal rights in refusing to deal
with Osborn for failure to purchase enough Goodyear TBA. Sinclair,
the court felt, had a legitimate business motive in desiring that its dealers
carry a high quality line of TBA. 6
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit, the decision of the District Court was reversed. 7 The Court of Ap-
peals concluded from the undisputed facts that an illegal tying arrangement
was entered into by Sinclair and Osborn in connection with plaintiff's
second lease. The terms of the arrangement required Osborn to buy
"substantial quantities" of Goodyear TBA if he desired to retain his lease
and sales agreement with Sinclair.8 The case was remanded to the Dis-
trict Court for findings on the question of recoverable damages.
On remand, the District Court found damages in the amount of 325
dollars (trebled, 975 dollars) resulting from purchases of Goodyear TBA
beyond those which plaintiff would have made absent the illegal arrange-
ment. The court also held that, although the tying arrangement may
have been illegal per se, the termination of a dealership pursuant to such
a plan is not a per se violation of the antitrust laws, but must itself be an
unreasonable restraint of trade before it can be the basis for recoverable
damages. The court concluded that since Sinclair believed that Osborn
was not selling sufficient amounts of gasoline and was devoting too much
effort to his retail Firestone business, there were no recoverable damages
resulting from the cancellation. The court further found that Sinclair
would have terminated plaintiff's lease and sales agreement in 1956 or 1957
for reasons not related to the antitrust violation, and that Osborn had
therefore proved damages amounting to only 12,000 dollars (trebled,
4 Sherman Act § 2, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1958):
"Every person who shall monopolize, or combine or conspire ... to monopolize . . .
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor . . . 2'
G Sherman Act § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958):
"Every contract, combination, . . or conspiracy . . . in restraint of trade . . . is
declared to be illegal .... "
6 Osborn v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 171 F. Supp. 37 (D. Md. 1959).
7 Osborn v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 286 F2d 832 (4th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 336
U.S. 963 (1961).
8 The Court of Appeals found the tying arrangement to be unreasonable per
se and illegal under the Sherman Act § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15
U.S.C. § 1 (1958), citing particularly Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356
U.S. 1 (1958). Osborn v. Sinclair Ref. Co., supra note 7, at 840. For a discussion of
this holding, see Alexander, "Full-Line Forcing Of Less Than Requirements By
Threat Of Refusal To Deal-A Per Se Violation?," 12 Syracuse L. Rev. 175 (1960).
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36,000 dollars).9 This amount was not awarded, only calculated. The
court did not explain how this figure was computed.
On the second appeal to the Court of Appeals, the District Court's
decision was again reversed.10 The court stated that, "having held that
there was an unlawful arrangement between Sinclair and its dealers,
and that Osborn's refusal to abide by it contributed to the cancellation," 1
it was contrary to the provisions of section 4 of the Clayton Act to
deny damages resulting from that cancellation 12 and also contrary to the
present state of the case law, which has limited a seller's right to refuse to
deal. 13 Accordingly, the court awarded to Osborn the 36,000 dollars
treble damages which the District Court had calculated but denied.14
At least part of the reason for a second appeal in this case rests with
the ambiguous instructions of the appellate court on the remand from the
first appeal.' 5 The Fourth Circuit found that Sinclair's arrangement
violated section 1 of the Sherman Act and that the lease was cancelled
in furtherance of the violation. Yet instead of a clear-cut remand for
nothing more than an assessment of damages, the court said:
Since Sinclair had the right to cancel the lease at its yearly
termination date, the problem arises whether damages flowing
from the cancellation are recoverable as damages resulting from
the violation of the antitrust laws. 16
This language would indicate that the Court of Appeals felt either that
further exploration was warranted as to whether the antitrust violation
had proximately caused the cancellation, entitling Osborn to damages, or
whether the mere existence of the contract right to terminate had any
bearing on plaintiff's claim.
The District Court, sensing but not quite grasping the first alternative,
expounded an interesting theory. The court declared that, although the
tying arrangement may have been illegal, the refusal to deal is not per se
illegal unless done in concert with others17 or in furtherance of a mo-
nopoly.'8 Absent one of these, said the court, the refusal to deal must
be an unreasonable restraint of trade in itself or there can be no claim for
damages. 19 As the Court of Appeals labored to explain on the second
9 Osborn v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 207 F. Supp. 856 (D. Md. 1962).
10 Osborn v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 324 F.2d 566 (4th Cir. 1963).
11 Id. at 570.
12 Id. at 571.
13 Id. at 573. See note 45 iifra.
14 The case was remanded again for further determination of reasonable attor-
neys fees.
1 Osborn v. Sinclair Ref. Co., supra note 7.
10 Id. at 840.
17 Note 21 infra.
18 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359,
375 (1927).
19 Osborn v. Sinclair Ref. Co., supra note 9, at 861:
Although the illegal tying arrangement may be illegal per se, and give rise
to criminal or civil action by the government or to private claims for dam-
[Vol. 25
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appeal,20 the District Court misconceived the offense and its relation to
plaintiff's cause of action. That court had cited Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-
Hale Stores, Inc. and Radiant Burner's, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light &
Coke Co.21 Although these were cases involving refusals to deal, it was not
the refusals to deal which violated the antitrust laws, but the combinations
or conspiracies of which the refusals were a manifestation. Similarly, in
the instant case, Sinclair's tying arrangement was found to violate section
1 of the Sherman Act, which makes illegal "every contract, combination
... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade .... ,22 Osborn's burden was to
show that the cancellation of his lease was proximately caused "by reason
of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws," 23 i.e., whether the termination
was a result of the antitrust violation or was generated by something else
2 4
The District Court did provide an answer to this question. Noting that
Sinclair believed that Osborn was not devoting a sufficient amount of time
to his service station, as reflected in his gasoline gallonage, the court found
that:
Sinclair probably would have terminated plaintiff's lease and deal-
ership in 1956 or 1957 for that reason, entirely apart from the fact
that he was not buying enough Goodyear TBA, although as . . .
found originally, both reasons affected the actual decision to
terminate in 1956 and neither reason predominated.2 5
Thus the cancellation was at least partially caused by an antitrust viola-
tion. The District Court then decided that, given two motives, one legal
and one illegal, the termination was not in itself an unreasonable restraint
of trade giving rise to a claim for treble damages.
The Court of Appeals subsequently overruled this, saying in part
that such a holding conflicts with the statutory right to treble damages
for injury caused by a violation of the antitrust laws . 2 The question of the
relation of the legal motive to the illegal one was not explained on remand
.or on the second appeal.
One may wonder whether an unsatisfactory dealer should recover
treble damages because a part of his supplier's motive in terminating the
ages such as those awarded [for purchases of undesired quantities of TBA],
the termination of a dealership in furtherance of such a plan or arrangement
is not per se a violation of the antitrust laws; such a termination will not
give rise to a claim for treble damages unless it amounts to an unreasonable
restraint of trade.
20 Osborn v. Sinclair Ref. Co., supra note 10.
21 See Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656
(1961) ; KIlor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
22 See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1910).
23 Clayton Act § 4, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958).
24 Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558 (1951): "[I]t
therefore was necessary for petitioners to introduce, in addition to the [antitrust
violation], evidence of the impact of the conspiracy on them, such as the cancella-
tio of their franchises . .. ."' (Emphasis added).
25 Osborn v. Sinclair Ref. Co., supra note 9, at 862.
26 Osborn v. Sinclair Ref. Co., supra note 10, at 571.
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franchise was an illegal one, particularly when the record reveals that
plaintiff would have lost his dealership anyway, for quite legal reasons.
The answer to this seems to rest in a footnote to the opinion from the
original trial, written some four years earlier. The District Court there
explained that although neither the legal nor the illegal motive predom-
inated, that would be of little moment to Osborn's claim for damages. 27
All that is required is that the illegal motive substantially contribute to the
decision to cancel.28 A court faced with a similar situation has stated that:
There are a number of factors acknowledged by plaintiff to have
contributed to his injury. But the usual rule in tort is that a
plaintiff may recover for loss to which the defendant's conduct
substantially contributed, notwithstanding other factors con-
tributed also.29
If the question on remand involved the problem of whether defend-
ant's violation proximately caused plaintiff's injury, then the result in
the appellate court accords with the "substantial contribution" rule.30
If, however, the question on remand was directed at the bearing on Os-
born's claim of the mere existence of Sinclair's contract right to terminate,
the problem was not broached by the District Court, and the Court of
Appeals buried its answer in a footnote.31  The mere existence of the
contract provision for cancellation has no bearing on plaintiff's claim. If
that right is exercised in furtherance of something prohibited by the anti-
trust laws, the contractual provision "gave the defendant no more immu-
nity from that tort than from any other tort." 32
A further interesting facet of this case is the amount of damages
calculated by the District Court. It is true that damages awarded in suits
brought under the Clayton Act need not be established with the exactitude
which may be required in other areas of the law.33 This is in accord with
the purpose of section 4, which "supplements the government enforce-
ment of the antitrust laws."34  But in general, the rules of damages are
still applicable, and it is curious that the District Court apparently disre-
garded the evidence in the record indicating that Osborn could have
avoided some of his loss.35 That court said that Osborn failed to prove:
27 Osborn v. Sinclair Ref. Co., supra note 6, at 44, n. 5.
28 Restatement, Torts § 431 (a) (1934), "The actor's . . . conduct is a legal
cause of harm to another if . .. his conduct is a substantial factor in bringing
about the harm ...."
29 Momand v. Universal Film Exchanges, Inc., 172 F2d 37, 43 (Ist Cir. 1948);
see also Story Parchment Co. v. Patterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555,
566 (1931).
30 The court nay have said this was not the question. See Osborn v. Sinclair
Ref. Co., supra note 10, at 570.
31 Osborn v. Sinclair Ref. Co., supra note 10, at 575, n. 17.
32 Vines v. General Outdoor Advertising Co., 171 F2d 487, 491 (2d Cir. 1948).
33 Story Parchment Co. v. Patterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555,
563 (1931).
34 United States v. Borden Co., 347 U.S. 514, 518 (1954) ; See also Kinnear-
Weed Corp. v. Humble Oil and Ref. Co., 214 F2d 891, 893 (5th Cir. 1954).
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any loss for any period extending more than one year after term-
ination of his lease. His damages for that period would approxi-
mate $12,000, most of which he would have sustained whenever
his lease was terminated.36
Clearly, the calculated figure was not diminished by any mitigating factors.
Yet the record indicates that Osborn made no effort to obtain a lease
and dealership from Sinclair's competitors who were making these sta-
tions available. Apparently this was due to Osborn's reluctance to enter
into a short term leasing arrangement such as he had had with Sinclair.3 7
However, for purposes of mitigation, the law of damages requires only
that the defendant show that similar opportunities were reasonably avail-
able, through which plaintiff could have avoided some part of the conse-
quences of defendant's wrong.38 Sinclair seems to have offered evidence
which met this burden. Osborn's understandable penchant for a more
satisfactory leasing arrangement does not excuse him from the rules which
require that his recovery for damages sustained be diminished by any
amount of loss which could reasonably have been avoided. Some account
should be taken of the evidence indicating that circumstances similar to
those of which he was deprived were reasonably available.
Similarly, there is evidence in the opinion that the 375 dollars
awarded for excess purchases of TBA, coerced by the tying arrangement,39
ought to have been diminished by mitigating factors. The District Court
found that although Osborn's lease provided for a rent based on the
amount of gasoline sold to Osborn, with a 400 dollar monthly mini-
mum, it was Sinclair's policy to waive that minimum and to accept lower
amounts.40 As intimated by Judge Haynsworth in his later dissent, this
waiver was probably in lieu of expected profits from the sale of Goodyear
TBA to Osborn.41 This seems to be a compensation by Sinclair, at least
in part, for any involuntary purchases of Goodyear TBA.
42
35 The District Court, although holding that he was not entitled to recover
damages, found that Osborn's loss from the termination of his lease was $12,000.
Osborn v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 207 F. Supp. 856, 864 (D. Md. 1962). On appeal, the
Court of Appeals held this figure to be "not clearly erroneous." Osborn v. Sinclair
Ref. Co., 324 F.2d 566, 575 (4th Cir. 1963).
36 Osborn v. Sinclair Ref. Co., supra note 9, at 864.
37 Osborn v. Sinclair Ref. Co., supra note 9, at 863: "He wanted the independ-
ence of a long term lease and to be free to develop his business as he saw fit."
38 McCormick, Damages § 33 (1935).
30 Osborn v. Sinclair Ref. Co., supra note 9, at 859.
40 Osborn v. Sinclair Ref. Co., supra note 6, at 43.
41 Osborn v. Sinclair Ref. Co., supra note 10, at 578.
42 The dissent points out, for example, that Sinclair, as primary lessee of the
service station, suffered a net rental loss in 1955 of $1586. If Sinclair waived
Osborn's minimum rents in that year, in lieu of expected TBA profits, that of
course contributed to this deficit. Osborn v. Sinclair Ref. Co., supra note 9, at 858,
reveals that Osborn purchased $4983 worth of Goodyear TBA in 1955. If Sinclair
received its maximum commission of 10% of this amount, it would still have suffered
a net loss of $1087.70.
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Sinclair did not receive any apparent fruits from its forbidden bargain,
yet Osborn did receive lower rents because of Sinclair's expectations.
Should plaintiff recover treble damages for a phantom loss? One of the
established defenses to actions for treble damages for injuries caused by
antitrust violations is that of "passing on."43 The typical situation is one
in which plaintiff has paid higher purchase prices resulting from an anti-
trust violation (e.g., price fixing), yet has passed on this increased cost to
his customers. 44 Plaintiff has suffered no legal injury within the meaning
of the antitrust laws, in spite of the violation. Analogizing from this hypo-
thetical situation to the instant case, Osborn's increased expenses have at
least to some degree been passed back to Sinclair, who accepted lower
rent (based on volume of petroleum products delivered to plaintiff) in lieu
of commissions from Goodyear on expected sale of TBA. It is arguable
that any recoverable damages based on coerced TBA purchases should be
diminished by the rent allowances accorded by Sinclair.
Curiously, there is no discussion in any of the four opinions in this
case to date concerning what would appear to be a significant obstacle to
any recovery by Osborn. The antitrust violation which Sinclair was
found to have perpetrated was an illegal agreement with the plaintiff.
Absent this agreement, Sinclair's policy requiring Osborn to buy sub-
stantial amounts of Goodyear TBA may have been legal under the Col-
gate doctrine.45 Osborn's role as a party to the agreement was therefore
essential to the existence of an antitrust offense. An obvious defense to
plaintiff's claim would seem to be that, although he suffered an injury
resulting from an agreement which violated the antitrust laws, plaintiff
was in pari delicto with the defendant in that agreement. The riposte
here would be that Osborn was not in pari delicto because he was coerced
into this agreement through Sinclair's superior economic bargaining
position.46  However, in a leading (and typical) case, in which such an
argument prevailed, plaintiff was confronted with the choice of either los-
ing a 50,000 dollar investment, or entering into an illegal contract.47 As
43 See Timberlake, "The Legal Requirements And Proof Of Damages In Treble
Damage Actions Under The Antitrust Laws," 30 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 231, 249
(1961); See generally Comment, 70 Yale L. J. 469 (1961).
44 Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 119 F.2d 747 (8th Cir. 1941).
45 See United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); FTC v.
Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922) ; United States v. Schrader's Son, Inc.,
252 U.S. 85 (1920); United States v. Colgate, 250 U.S. 300 (1919). The Colgate
doctrine has typically been invoked in cases involving resale price maintenance. The
Court of Appeals's reason for rejecting it in the instant case, however, was that
defendant's action had gone beyond the narrow limits of the doctrine by entering
into the agreement with Osborn. Osborn v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 286 F2d 832, 839 (4th
Cir. 1960). This would indicate that the court felt that the Colgate doctrine would
otherwise have been applicable to Sinclair's policy in this situation, which did not
involve pricing.
46 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359,
377 (1927) ; Corbin, Contracts § 1537 (1962).
47 Ring v. Spina, 148 F.2d 647 (2d Cir. 1945).
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has been indicated, Osborn, perhaps, had more latitude. Other service
station opportunities were evidently available in the Reisterstown area.
Some were apparently even more suitable to his purposes (which em-
phasized the sale of Firestone TBA, rather than gasoline) than the Sin-
clair site.48 Yet plaintiff operated under this agreement for approximately
eight years. Granted, his cooperation was sullen, and did not meet Sin-
clair's expectations, but he did increase his purchases of Goodyear TBA,
pursuant to the agreement. Osborn does not fit squarely in the mold of a
helpless victim, and the coercion argument is not immediately persuasive
on his behalf.49 Further, in this area where a national policy, espoused
by Congress in the Sherman Act, has forbidden agreements in restraint
of trade, it is not at all clear that "coercion" should have a broad role in
excusing the action taken by person's in Osborn's situation.50 "For
acquiescence in an illegal scheme is as much a violation of the Sherman
Act as the creation and promotion of one."' 1
The counter arguments have the support of precedent. Section 4
of the Clayton Act indicates the intent of Congress to protect the victims
of antitrust violators. The court in Ring v. Spina, in surveying the prob-
lems involved in the defense of in pari delicto, stated that "there appears
a definite tendency to hold those not actively engaged in promoting mo-
nopoly to be victims, rather than participants in antitrust violations. '5 2
48 Osborn v. Sinclair Ref. Co., supra note 9, at 863:
Plaintiff opened a Shell station there on February 12, 1957. Plaintiff wanted
this property because it was well located and well designed for his Firestone
TBA business, although not so well located or designed for the sale of
gasoline. Although his sales of gasoline there have been less than his sales
at his Sinclair station, his average net earnings for the years 1958-1961
have been higher than . . . during the period 1948-1955 ....
49 Indeed, Osborn's situation is remarkably similar to that in Eastman Kodak
Co. v. Blackmore, 277 F. 694 (2d Cir. 1921). After Eastman had suspended him
as a customer for the second time, Blackmore agreed to abide by a resale price
maintenance contract, in violation of the antitrust laws. In an action for damages
against Eastman some eight years later, plaintiff was denied recovery on the theory
that he was it; pari delicto with the defendant. See Mandeville Island Farms v.
American Crystal Sugar Co., 64 F. Supp. 265 (S.D. Cal.); aff'd., 159 F2d 71
(9th Cir.) ; rev'd on other grounds, 334 U.S. 219 (1948), where plaintiff was said
to be it pari delicto with defendant, and was denied recovery under the Clayton
Act, for signing an illegal contract for sale of his crop to one of the three available
outlets, all three of which conspired to require identical contracts from all beet
growers in plaintiff's area.
50 The thrust of this suggestion is not that recovery under § 4 of the Clayton
Act should be defeated in all cases involving "technical" pari delicto, where plaintiff
has been forced into some illegal agreement. Rather, it is that the elements of
coercion alleged should be examined to see if they are of such compelling force as
to remove the plaintiff from the scope of the theory of pari delicto. See note 46
supra.
51 United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 161 (1948).
52 Supra note 47, at 652. Further, at 653, this court said:
Where the parties stand actually and truly in pari delicto, the law should
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It is questionable that the antitrust philosophy requires such zealous pro-
tection. While Osborn was by no means an eager participant in an anti-
trust violation, it is uncertain that his participation was altogether without
choice. Certainly Sinclair had the upper hand in bargaining power, but
this is crucial only if Osborn, for economic reasons, had to retain his Sin-
clair dealership. If there were, in fact, equal opportunities available, his
choice of the one involving an illegal agreement does not place him clearly
or convincingly in the victim's role, and his right to treble damages can
be questioned.
leave them where it finds them .... But here without even a showing of
economic coercion .... considerations of public policy demand court inter-
vention in behalf of such a person, even if technically he could be consid-
ered in pari delicto .... Any other conclusion would mean that for many,
perhaps most, victims of restraint of trade, private remedies under the
Sherman [sic] Act would be illusory, if not quite non-existent.
